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2.1  Introduction 
A striking fact about the organization of  modem financial markets-and 
one of the great interest to market regulators and exchanges-is  the prevalence 
of market fragmentation, that is, multiple mechanisms or locations for trading 
a security. A share of common stock, for example, may be traded on one of 
many organized exchanges, through dealers away from an exchange, in another 
country, or indirectly through a derivative financial contract, which in turn may 
be traded on an exchange or through a dealer. 
To the extent that securities markets provide a central trading location serv- 
ing to  minimize the search cost of finding a counterparty, fragmentation is a 
puzzle. On the other hand, market participants often have private information, 
either about the “true value” of the traded security, or about their trading mo- 
tives.’ In markets with asymmetric information, informed traders earn a profit 
at the expense of the uninformed traders2  Therefore there is clearly an incen- 
tive to create mechanisms that mitigate (for at least some subset of partici- 
pants) costs created by the existence of private information. One obvious way 
for uninformed traders to minimize these costs is to trade in a nonanonymous 
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1. As Fischer Black (1990) has observed, having no information and knowing you  have no 
information can be valuable private information. 
2. Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) are examples 
of  models like this. 
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market.  Nonanonymous  arrangements  often have the  appearance  of  a frag- 
mented market. 
Although forms of fragmentation have changed over time with technological 
and new product developments, fragmentation has been a perennial issue of 
interest to regulators and market participants. There have been a number of 
academic  papers  on  topics  related  to  fragmentation  (see,  for  example, 
Chowdhry  and Nanda  [1991]; Madhavan  (19931; Pagano  [1989]; and  Roell 
[ 19901). Harris (1992) in particular  discusses fragmentation in detail and ar- 
gues that it is an outgrowth of different traders’ having different trading needs 
(for example, immediacy versus price improvement). 
This paper discusses fragmentation in the context of two observations: first, 
brokers expend resources inducing investors to trade; second, most securities 
markets are replete with mechanisms permitting firms to capture order flow, 
including both implicit and explicit payments for order flow. We argue that 
these  observations  together  suggest  a  reason  for persistent  fragmentation: 
when order flow arises from brokerage activity, the information characteristics 
of that order flow are known to the broker, or at least better known to the broker 
than to an average market maker. There is then an incentive for the broker to 
serve as a counterparty to the trade rather than just as a brokerage conduit. In 
order to avoid issues related to dual trading and front running, we assume that 
the brokers do not trade for their own account on information extracted from 
the customer order flow nor do they hold any uncrossed trades in their portfo- 
lio.  This differs  from  the  focus  of  papers  such as Fishman  and  Longstaff 
(1992), Roell (1990), and Grossman (1992). 
We assume that there exist both perfectly informed and uninformed traders, 
who have a choice of two ways to trade: with a broker who knows the trader’s 
informedness, or anonymously with a market maker. We model market makers 
as in Easley and O’Hara (1987)-they  are risk-neutral competitive agents who 
set a bid and ask price and accept all one-share orders at those prices. Brokers, 
however, serve a quite different  function. They accept orders from traders, 
charging a bid-ask spread that is possibly type-dependent, cross buys against 
sells, and then export to a market maker any remaining order flow, paying the 
market bid-ask  spread. Unlike market makers, brokers in our model face no 
price risk. And since brokers do not retain shares, they risklessly earn the bid- 
ask spread on any orders they net against one another. 
In this setting, we compare monopolist and competitive brokers. In all cases, 
this kind of brokerage activity increases the bid-ask spread charged by market 
makers. The two kinds of broker treat their customers quite differently, how- 
ever. The monopolist  broker  simply  charges  customers  the  market  bid-ask 
spread. Competitive brokers, on the other hand, charge different spreads to the 
two types of customers, and in general both kinds of customers will be charged 
a lower spread than that set by the market maker. The ability of the broker to 
net orders, coupled with competition, forces the broker to charge each type of 
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pected net order export. Perhaps surprisingly, perfectly informed investors will 
in general be charged a price less than the full bid-ask spread. 
We find that fragmentation may be a reflection of increased price competi- 
tion, and that the fragmented  and competitive system provides  better prices 
for customers than the less-fragmented monopolistic broker case. Order flow 
intermediaries in this setting foster competition at the brokerage level but raise 
the bid-ask spread in the central market. 
As an example, consider a corporation that receives  advice from trading 
firms and then undertakes a hedging transaction in the over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives market. By virtue of understanding the customer’s trading motives, 
the brokers understand the information content of the order. When the cus- 
tomer obtains quotes on the deal, brokers will bid in a way that reflects their 
expected cost of hedging (or “exporting”)  the trade. Obviously this expected 
cost will be greater if the broker expects other orders in the same direction. 
The perspective on fragmentation in this paper can be contrasted with the 
view that fragmentation reflects skimming the best customers from existing 
markets. First, brokers in this paper optimally accept all customers, informed 
and uninformed. Second, while we do not model the market participation deci- 
sion of potential traders, our model is consistent with a world in which brokers 
can increase order flow by expending resources. The mechanisms that result 
in fragmented markets are also the mechanisms that give brokers the incentive 
to generate business. This view suggests that there is no “silver bullet” trading 
system that, if implemented, would attract all order flow. Rather, it suggests 
that central markets and brokerage markets serve different needs for different 
investors. This argument is very similar to aspects of Merton (1992) and Har- 
ris (1992). 
Obviously, there are dimensions to fragmentation other than those we em- 
phasize. In particular, agency problems-which  we ignore-may  be severe in 
practice. Our goal in this paper is not to exhaustively explore legal, regulatory, 
and  practical  issues associated  with fragmentation,  but  rather  to provide  a 
framework for thinking about the link between fragmentation and market li- 
quidity. 
Section 2.2 introduces the model of  the security market, and sections 2.3 
and 2.4 look at the equilibrium  bid-ask spreads and distributions of  traders 
across brokerage firms and the central market in monopoly and perfectly com- 
petitive environments, respectively. Section 2.5 discusses policy implications. 
Proofs of the lemmas and propositions are in the appendix. 
2.2  The Model 
In this section, we describe the trading environment for a single risky asset. 
The assumptions and analysis are most similar to Easley and O’Hara (1987). 
The value of the risky asset is given by  8 = 8,  with probability  .5 or 0,  with 
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2.2.1  Traders 
All traders are constrained to buy one unit or sell one unit of the asset. There 
are two types of traders, traders who are perfectly  informed, of whom there 
are N,,  and traders who are uninformed, of whom there are No. When a trader 
is perfectly informed, he buys if 8 = 8, and sells if 8 = OL with probability  1. 
An uninformed trader buys one unit with probability .S and sells one unit with 
probability  .S. A fraction p of uninformed  traders are discretionary; the rest 
are nondiscretionary. The discretionary uninformed traders, of whom there are 
pNo, can choose where to trade. The nondiscretionary traders, of whom there 
are (1 -  p)No, must trade in the central market. Fully informed traders can 
trade wherever they choose. 
2.2.2  Market Makers 
The central market can be thought of as the floor of an exchange or as a 
dealer market. In this market, trades are submitted simultaneously and anony- 
mously to a risk-neutral market maker. Prior to observing order flow, the mar- 
ket maker posts a bid, 6,  and an ask, a, at which he will satisfy all orders. 
The bid and ask prices are set so that the market maker earns zero expected 
profits. Let BH  equal the expected number of  buys in the market if 0 = 8,  and 
let B, be the expected number of buys in the market if 8 = 0,.  In order for the 
market maker to earn zero expected profits, the ask must satisfy 
0 = .SBH(a -  8,)  + SBJa -  0,). 
Solving for a, we get 
The bid, which is derived in an analogous way, is equal to 
where S, and S,  are the expected number of sell orders if 6 = 8,  and 8 = €IH, 
respectively. The number of buys and sells in the market is affected by both 
the traders who trade directly in the central market and the net exports of the 
brokerage  firms. Given  symmetry between  good and bad information  states 
and the symmetry between uninformed  traders'  propensity  to buy or sell, it 
follows that B,  = S,  and B, = S,.  Therefore, the bid-ask spread can be writ- 
ten as 
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2.2.3  Brokers 
A brokerage firm is a profit-maximizing trading firm. By assumption, bro- 
kers know a customer’s type. In general, we can imagine that brokers learn a 
customer’s type as part of marketing brokerage services. For example, a cus- 
tomer could be a firm with hedgeable exposure (e.g., currencies, interest rates, 
commodity prices), but where management lacks knowledge of financial hedg- 
ing products, and is uncertain how to measure its own exposure. Because of 
correlations among input and output prices, it is often not obvious what deriva- 
tives position would constitute a hedge. While helping the firm determine the 
appropriate hedge, the broker learns the motives for the trade and the market 
views of the customer. 
The broker is assumed not to invest for its own account. Brokers are able to 
immediately and frictionlessly export net order flow to the central market; thus 
brokers never bear inventory price risk. Obviously, in practice, broker-dealers 
will hold some inventory since, although they may provide immediate execu- 
tion to customers, they will not be able to export large net order flow immedi- 
ately without a price penalty. This in turn will make them sensitive to the infor- 
mation  of  customers:  other things  equal, an  order from a  more  informed 
customer is costlier to accept. 
As in the central market, the customers of  a brokerage firm either buy one 
unit or sell one unit. After the buys and the sells are netted, the firm exports 
the unmatched buys or sells to the market. Note that, whereas individual trad- 
ers trade only one share, the broker is able to anonymously trade many shares 
at once. This means that the brokerage firms earn a spread on any matched 
orders and must pay a spread on any unmatched orders. 
The requirement that net order flow be exported to the central market can 
be motivated by the assumption that brokers face capital requirements and have 
limited capital. In this case, they would be forced to export net order flow or, 
similarly, run a hedged book. Many broker-dealers do in fact operate this way. 
For example, if a broker-dealer serves as counterparty in long-lived transac- 
tions involving OTC derivatives, customers will be concerned about broker- 
dealer credit ratings and long-term viability; hedging the book thus enhances 
the ability of  the firm to engage in these transactions. The requirement that 
brokers not hold shares means that they are unable to trade on information they 
may glean from customer order flow. 
Let n,, n, 5 pNo, and n,,  n,  5 N,, denote the number of uninformed and 
informed customers, respectively, of a brokerage firm. Let So and S, denote the 
number of  sell orders by  uninformed  and informed customers, respectively, 
and let B, and B, denote the number of buy orders by uninformed and informed 
customers, respectively, where B, + So = n,)  and B, + S, = n,.  Let B = B, + B, 
and S = S,, + S,.  The ask and bid prices, u, and b,,  are charged by a brokerage 
firm to customers of type i, i = 0, 1. The profit of a brokerage firm is given by 40  Kathleen Hagerty and  Robert L. McDonald 
-a(B -  S) 
+b(S -  B) 
if B -  S > 0, 
if S -  B > 0,  5 = a&  -  boSo + a,B, -  b,S, - { 
and expected profits are therefore 
~(n,,  n,) = E(5)  = %(ao -  b,)n, + %(u, -  b,)n, -  aE(B -  S I B -  S > 0) 
Prob(B -  S > 0) + bE(S -  B I S -  B >  O)Prob(S -  B > 0) 
Since E(B -  S  1 B -  S > O)Prob(B -  S > 0) = E(S -  B I S -  B >  O)Prob(S 
-  B > 0), we can rewrite the expected broker profit as 
(4) 
where 
IT@,,  n,) = %(a -  b)[Aono + A,n, -  $(no,  n,)l, 
A,  = (a, -  bl)/(a  -  b), 
and 
(5)  $(no,  n,)  = 2E(B -  S 1 B -  S >  O)Prob(B -  S > 0). 
A,  is the fraction of  the market bid-ask  spread that the broker  charges to a 
customer, and S4 is the expected number of trades exported to the market by 
the brokerage firm. Note that the expected broker profit is proportional to the 
market bid-ask spread, and is decreasing in the number of orders exported to 
the central market. 
In the following sections, we first look at the mathematics of the net exports 
and then at the effect of the broker market on the distribution of traders across 
the central market and brokerage firms and the effect on the spreads that trad- 
ers must pay.  Two market  structures are considered,  a monopoly brokerage 
firm and perfectly competitive brokerage firms. 
2.2.4  Understanding Net Order Exports 
Since the focus of  the paper  is on order netting  at the broker level, it is 
crucial to understand the behavior of +(no,  n,),  the expected order export. We 
are interested in two properties of 4: (1) how does the expected order export 
change when new customers are added, and (2)  how does the expected order 
export change when one type of customer is replaced by the other. Let W de- 
note the total number of customers, that is, W = n"  + n,;  when there is no 
possibility  of confusion, we will write +(no),  suppressing the argument n, = 
W -  no.  For future reference, we now state some facts about 4. 
LEMMA  1. (1)  The expected net order flow is nondecreasing if one customer 
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(2) If an uninformed customer is added, the expected net order flow per cus- 
tomer is nonincreasing: 
(3) If an informed customer is added, the expected net order flow per informed 
customer is nonincreasing: 
For a given mix of  customers, adding customers increases the expected  net 
order export but at a decreasing rate, in a sense lemma 1  makes precise. It may 
be surprising that adding perfectly informed investors does not always increase 
net order flow by one. To see this, consider the case where no > 0 and n, = 
0. At this point, adding a single informed  investor is exactly like adding an 
uninformed investor because the informed investor’s trade is uncorrelated with 
the net trade of the uninformed investors. Adding a second informed investor 
contributes to net order flow by more than an uninformed  investor since the 
informed trader’s trade is partially correlated  with the trades of the no unin- 
formed investors and the one informed investor. As we add informed investors, 
the marginal contribution to order flow increases. At the point where n, 2 n,,, 
additional informed investors  increase net order flow one for one. This pro- 
vides intuition for the second result: 
LEMMA  2. +(no,  W -  no)  is decreasing and convex in no. 
The intuition for both properties is straightforward. Increasing no by  1 substi- 
tutes an uninformed customers for an informed customer. Conditional on net 
order flow being positive, the magnitude of the net order flow is smaller, the 
smaller the  informed  (and hence positively  correlated) component of  order 
flow. 
Convexity implies that substituting informed for uninformed order flow in- 
creases the conditional expectation at an increasing rate. Substituting a single 
informed order for one uninformed  order adds an order that is uncorrelated. 
Substituting an informed order for an uninformed order when there is a mix of 
informed and uninformed orders replaces an uncorrelated order with a partially 
correlated order and thus increases the conditional expectation. 
2.3  Monopoly Brokerage Market 
2.3.1  The Profit of the Monopoly Firm 
Consider a market with a single brokerage firm. Traders are willing to trade 
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implies that the traders do not take into account the effect that their choice has 
on the equilibrium spread.) From examination of the profit function, (4), it is 
obvious that the monopoly broker sets X,  = A, = I;  that is, he charges custom- 
ers the full market spread. No customers would be attracted at a higher price, 
and the broker would needlessly give up profits at a lower spread. The broker- 
age firm chooses the number of informed and uninformed customers it wishes 
to have. From (4), therefore, the broker’s maximization problem is to choose 
n, and n, so as to maximize 
(6)   no) n,)  = %[a(no,  12,) -  Wn,, fi,)l[n, +  -  +(no>  n,)l. 
The choice of no  and n,  affects the brokerage firm’s profits in two ways. First, 
it affects how well matched are the buys and the sells, Other things equal, the 
greater the matching of trades, the more profitable the brokerage firm. Second, 
the choice of n, and n,  affects the ratio of informed to uninformed in the central 
market, which in turn affects the size of the market bid-ask spread. The monop- 
olistic broker takes this into account in selecting customers. 
2.3.2  Determination of the Market Bid-Ask Spread 
The market bid-ask spread for a given customer mix, (no,  nl), is given in the 
following proposition. 
PROPOSITION  1. For a given customer mix (no,  nl), the market bid-ask spread 
is given by 
If n,, 5 n,,  the spread simplifies to 
COROLLARY  1. The market spread is increasing in n, and nondecreasing in n,. 
The number of buys and sells in the market is affected by the net exports of 
the brokerage firm. As the number of uninformed customers increases, more 
uninformed trades are absorbed and crossed internally by the broker, which 
means they are never seen by the market maker. With effectively fewer unin- 
formed traders, the market maker will raise the bid-ask spread. When the bro- 
ker accepts a perfectly informed trade, the bid-ask spread either increases (if 
n, >  n,)  or remains unchanged. If  no >  n,,  an informed trader switching from 
the market maker to the broker does not change the expected difference in the 
number of  “correct” and “incorrect” trades (e.g., B, -  B,.), but there is a de- 
crease in the total number of trades the market maker sees (because the broker 
absorbs some trades). When n, 5 n,,  an additional informed trade switching 
from the market to the broker does not affect the expected number of trades in 
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Substituting the bid-ask  spread into (6) yields the broker's expected profit 
for a given customer mix (no,  nl): 
2.3.3  Equilibrium in the Market with a Monopoly Brokerage Firm 
Brokers in general want more orders, since both the bid-ask spread and the 
expected number of crossed orders are increasing in no + n, -  +(n,, nl), and 
n, + n,  -  +(n,,,  n,)  is nondecreasing in scale. Thus, brokers accept as many 
orders as possible,  up to the point where n, = n,.  This is summarized in the 
following proposition: 
PROPOSITION  2. (1) The broker sets n, = pN,. (2) The broker accepts informed 
trades up to the point where n,  = no = pN,, and is indifferent about accepting 
further trades. (3) The expected profit is equal to 
The equilibrium  spread is maximized  since the discretionary uninformed 
traders have been absorbed by the broker and the number of informed traders 
is unaffected by the presence of the broker. All traders, whether they trade with 
the broker or in the central market, are worse off relative to a setting where 
there is only a central market due to the higher spread. It is also interesting to 
note that, unlike many microstructure models, profits are nondecreasing in the 
number of  informed traders. This is because unmatched informed trades are 
not held in inventory and hence do not impose any cost on the broker. 
Note  that  the  broker  earns  positive  profits  from uninformed  customers. 
Thus, it is in the broker's interest to induce uninformed traders to trade. While 
outside the model, suppose that the brokerage firm could attract uninformed 
traders  who  were  not  participating  in  the  market.  These traders  could  be 
thought of as people who can be induced to trade if the brokerage firm makes 
some kind of marketing effort. In this case, the firm would not just be skim- 
ming from the central market but increasing the participation in the market as 
a whole. The addition  of new customers lowers the spread, but the effect of 
netting is such that many new customers would be required for the spread to 
be as low as it would have been had there been no brokerage firm. With endoge- 
nous order flow (which we do not model), there is an ambiguous effect on the 
market spread of broker crossing of customer orders. 
2.4  Competitive Brokers 
In the competitive case, we assume that the composition of orders between 
uninformed and informed investors is selected by the broker; however, brokers 
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speaking, the larger the scale of the broker, the more netting is achieved on a 
per-customer basis, and a larger broker could therefore charge customers lower 
prices. The restriction on firm size is necessary to ensure a competitive out- 
come, and it could reflect diseconomies of scale to brokerage activities. How- 
ever, we show later that, in the presence of what we term “order flow intermedi- 
aries,’’ the limit on firm scale is moot. We also assume that there is free entry 
into brokerage and to simplify the solution (i.e., to avoid an integer problem), 
we assume there are Mn,’  uninformed customers in the pool available to bro- 
kers, and M(W -  n,*)  informed customers. 
2.4.1  Analysis of Equilibrium 
Unlike in the monopoly case, where all customers pay the same price, in 
the competitive case we model the broker as posting a type-specific price for 
customers, and brokers are permitted to choose the fraction of informed and 
uninformed  customers.  Customers either accept  or reject  the  posted  price. 
Clearly, given the free-entry condition, in equilibrium all brokers must post the 
same  type-specific  price.  The  complication  associated  with  type-specific 
prices  is that customers with different  information  contribute differently  to 
netting of orders. Further, the contribution to netting depends on both the size 
of  the firm and the customer composition. Since the broker does not actually 
hold the order, however, the information content of a particular order does not 
affect the broker except as it affects netting. This differs from standard micro- 
structure models such as Kyle (1 985), where risk arising from holding the or- 
der flow is the reason prices depend on the information content of the order 
flow. 
Unlike  in the monopolistic case, we assume that the number of customers 
and brokerage firms is sufficiently  large that, in setting prices, brokers do not 
take into account their effect on the market bid-ask spread. The problem for 
the brokerage firm is to set prices for customers that take account of the effect 
on order flow export. As noted above, hl in general depends on both the scale 
and customer composition of the firm. For example, suppose the firm has only 
uninformed  customers.  Clearly, the more such customers, the lower the cost 
per  customer of  order flow exports,  and the  lower the average  competitive 
charge to a customer. 
From (4), we can see that if brokers earn zero profits, we have 
We now have the apparatus necessary to define an equilibrium. Recall that, by 
assumption, competitive brokerage firms can have only W customers. Brokers 
announce type-specific prices for orders, and customers give their order to the 
broker with the lowest price. Therefore, given the free-entry condition, all bro- 
kers with a positive order flow from a given type charge the same price for a 
given type. We use the Nash equilibrium concept, in that brokers take as given 
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DEFINITION  1. An equilibrium is a type-specific price schedule (A,,,  A,} such 
that (1) brokers earn nonnegative  expected profits, taking as given prices of 
other brokers; (2) newly entering brokers earn nonpositive  expected profits; 
(3) customers are no worse off dealing with brokers than transacting directly 
at the market bid-ask spread. 
The next proposition is a direct consequence of the convexity of +. 
PROPOSITION  3. All brokers select the same mix of informed and uninformed 
customers.’ 
Note that in no case can the equilibrium price for a given type exceed the 
zero-profit price for a broker that accepted customers only of that type. Other- 
wise, it would be profitable for a broker to specialize in customers of that type. 
Thus, we have 
PROPOSITION  4. Type-specific  prices  can never  be  greater  than  the  prices 
charged by a firm specializing in customers of a given type: A,(n,)  5 Xo(0); 
A,(n,) 5 X,(W). 
Convexity of + implies that, given equilibrium prices, all brokers seek to 
have the same mix of informed and uninformed customers. Given a potential 
equilibrium, however, we must verify that at the posited prices it does not pay 
for the broker to accept a different mix of customers. In particular, if n, is the 
equilibrium customer mix, it must be the case that profits are nonpositive  at 
the same prices but with a different customer mix, that is, 
(8)  (n,  +j)A,(n,,) + (W -  (no  +j))X,(qJ 5 +(no +A  -no ‘j  5 W -  n,. 
Because + is convex, an equilibrium price schedule exists, and we present an 
example price schedule below. The proof  of  existence involves showing the 
following: 
LEMMA  3.1. At an equilibrium price schedule, if it is not optimal to switch the 
customer mix forj = 5 1, then it is not optimal to switch for any largerj. Thus, 
in verifying that (8) is satisfied for a given no,  it suffices to check the casesj = 
21. 
LEMMA  3.2. Convexity of + is a necessary condition for the existence of  an 
equilibrium price schedule. 
LEMMA  3.3. Equilibrium A,(n,,  n,)  and X,(n,,  n,)  schedules are given by 
(9) 
-  +(no, w  -  no -  l)]; 
3. Note that, because of the assumption that there are MW brokerage customers, the only way 
there can be two different customer mixes is if  nh and ni differ by more than one. 46  Kathleen Hagerty and  Robert L. McDonald 
-  44% - 1, w  -  no)]. 
Since the convexity of + is used to construct a price schedule, and since con- 
vexity is necessary for an equilibrium to exist, we have 
PROPOSITION  5. There exists an equilibrium price schedule if  and only if + 
is convex. 
From lemma 2, + is convex. Since we have assumed that the numbers of 
traders accessible to brokers is a multiple of 
COROLLARY  2. It is an equilibrium  for there to be M  brokerage  firms, each 
with ni uninformed and W -  ni informed customers. 
There are several interesting features of the equilibrium. First, if  a mix of 
customers exists, then it is optimal for all firms to have a mix of  customers. It 
would not be optimal, for example, to specialize in uninformed customers if 
other firms had a mix of  informed and uninformed  customers. The intuition 
for this follows from the properties  of  an equilibrium price  schedule:  for a 
fixed number of total customers, as brokers choose to trade with fewer custom- 
ers of  a given type,  the price charged  customers of  that  type declines.  For 
example, the marginal value of an uninformed customer is greater, the smaller 
the number of  uninformed  customers (and hence  the greater the number of 
informed customers). Similarly, adding an informed  customer to a group of 
uninformed customers is not costly because the informed customer is uncorre- 
lated with existing  order flow. However, adding an informed  customer to a 
large number of  informed customers is more expensive. 
The value of having uninformed customers is greater for a broker who also 
has informed customers, so firms that have both types would be able to under- 
cut the price of firms that had only uninformed customers. Effectively, custom- 
ers of different types cross-subsidize one another. 
If  all customers who can deal with brokers  do so, and if brokers  charge 
equilibrium fees as outlined above, then customers are at least as well off deal- 
ing with brokers as with market makers, and brokers have no incentive to at- 
tract a different mix of customers, given prices charged by other brokers. 
It is worth emphasizing that, since customers end up receiving a better bid- 
ask spread from the broker than from the market maker, equilibrium requires 
that  all customers who can use a competitive  broker,  do use  a competitive 
broker. Otherwise, customers of  the same type would pay different prices for 
the same order. 
we have 
2.4.2  Example 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 present a numerical example, with the competitive bro- 
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onstrates  how  customers of  different  types  effectively  cross-subsidize  each 
other in the competitive equilibrium. Figure 2.1 displays +(no,  n,)  for all differ- 
ent possible  mixes  of  customer types.  Figure 2.2 displays  the  competitive 
spreads charged to each type of customer, computed using the schedule de- 
rived in the appendix in the proof of lemma 3. The cross-subsidization is evi- 
dent in the first informed  customer being charged the same spread as unin- 
formed customers. As the customer mix moves from uninformed to informed, 
the spread charged the informed rises and that charged the uninformed falls. 
Once there are more informed than uninformed customers, the uninformed are 
charged a zero spread since ex ante the contribute nothing to the firm’s net 
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2.4.3  Effect on the Market Bid-Ask Spread 
As in the monopolistic case, +(no,  W -  n,)  becomes linear when no < W/2, 
with the result that the broker is indifferent about accepting additional unin- 
formed traders. Thus, as in the monopolistic case, there is a corner solution at 
n, = W/2. Although the maximization problems faced by the monopolist and 
the competitive brokers are different, the implications for the market bid-ask 
spread are similar. Since both kinds of brokers net orders and export the resid- 
ual, exported order flow represents more information than the original order 
flow. 
The difference between  the monopolist and the competitive broker stems 
from the fact that competitive order flow exports are greater by 
M  c  +,(n;,  w -  nil -  +(Mn,’, M(W -  n,’)). 
1=  I 
Thus, the  increase in the  spread is smaller in the  competitive case. Notice, 
however, that this implies that, for a given spread, brokerage customers do not 
pay the lowest possible fees because there is less than full netting at the broker 
level. This suggests that it would be profitable for a broker to enter as a “bro- 
ker’s broker,” crossing broker net order flow. 
2.4.4  Competitive Order Flow Intermediaries 
Because the expected order export per customer declines with the number 
of customers, there is a natural economy to scale for brokers. If there are com- 
petitive order flow intermediaries, however, scale economies can be achieved 
through the purchase and sale of order flow. For example, suppose there are M 
retail brokers who on average export $(no,  W -  no)  shares each. Uncondition- 
ally, this export has a 50 percent chance of being either a buy or a sell. Assum- 
ing that the order flow broker knows the customer characteristics of the retail 
broker, expected profits are 
M[.Sa$(n,, w -  no) -  .56+(n,, w -  no)] -  .5(a -  b)+(Mno,  M(W -  no)). 
With entry, the order flow broker’s expected profits must be zero. This means 
that in order to attract business the order flow broker charges the retail broker 
a discount from the market spread. On a per-firm basis, this discount is 
.5(a -  b)[+(no,  w -  no) -  +(Mno, M(w -  no))/MI. 
Since 4(Mn0,  M(  W -  n,))/M is decreasing in M, the order flow broker provides 
a bigger discount the greater the number of customers. 
Notice  that with this discount added to the broker profit function (4), the 
broker sets a spread for customer orders that is equivalent to having MW cus- 
tomers. As long as there are no transaction costs or frictions, there can be many 
layers of order flow brokers, each buying order flow, aggregating it, and giving 
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In  comparing  the  monopolistic  equilibrium  and  competitive  equilibrium 
where there are order flow intermediaries, we find that both produce the same 
effect on the spread, but customers receive  better prices in the competitive 
case because brokers bid for orders and pass along any cost advantages. The 
interesting point is that the competitive case is more “fragmented,” in the sense 
that there are many more separate mechanisms by which shares are exchanged. 
In this setting, however, fragmentation is associated with benefits for custom- 
ers because it reflects increased competition for orders. 
2.5  Discussion and Policy Implications 
its robustness. 
In this section, we discuss some policy implications of the model, as well as 
2.5.1  OTC versus Exchange-Oriented Markets 
We have focused on the implications of order netting for market spreads. A 
natural question is, to what kind of market does this model apply? One inter- 
pretation of the model is that brokers are also serving as principals in a trade, 
and customer prices and  orders are determined  individually in negotiations 
with the broker without any requirement  that they be exposed to the central 
market. This description is suggestive of the OTC market for custom financial 
products, in which broker-dealers  originate the trade,  serve as counterparty, 
and generally hedge the transaction in some related central market. 
The model also has applicability for thinking about equity markets, how- 
ever. A common  description of  trade in listed equities in the  United States 
characterizes stock trading as involving the submission of an order to a central 
exchange, where it is bid for by  a variety of  market participants. While this 
does appear to describe how a significant fraction of orders are handled, the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (199 1) report on order flow induce- 
ment practices makes clear that there are many ways for firms to acquire or- 
der flow. 
Explicit payment for orders. 
Agreements  for exchange of order pow. For example, on Nasdaq, broker A 
may direct orders for stock X to broker B, who in turn  directs orders for 
stock Y to broker A. Such order-preferencing  arrangements are often ex- 
plicit. 
Vertical integration of  brokers and specialists. For a given  stock, the  In- 
termarket Trading  System reports posted bids  and asks from a variety  of 
locations. However, any market maker can take an order for his own account 
by matching the best quoted price. Thus, a broker for securities firm XYZ 
can send orders to market  maker A,  who is owned by  XYZ. The market 
maker can then accept the order on behalf of the brokerage firm by matching 
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All  of  these  practices  effectively  provide  ways  for brokers  to  selectively 
choose to be counterparty to an order. 
In addition, Angel (1994), using data from the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), shows that different kinds of order flow (e.g., retail versus proprietary 
trades) systematically receive different amounts of price improvement over the 
spread, as would be suggested by our model. We conclude that the model is at 
least partially descriptive of both exchange-centered and OTC markets. 
2.5.2  Policy Implications 
The interesting policy  implication is that increased fragmentation reflects 
increased  competition for orders, generating better prices for customers and 
no worse prices in the central market. Of course, this results from a comparison 
of  central market prices between two settings with broker-dealers. Since we 
do not model  the decisions of  customers to trade in the first place, welfare 
comparisons  with just a central market  (which typically  will  yield  a lower 
spread) are not possible.  It seems safe to speculate, however, that in general 
there will always exist parameters where such comparisons are ambiguous, and 
the purpose of analysis such as this is to point out sources of costs and benefits. 
Although we do not model the generation of  order flow, it is obvious that 
once a broker is permitted  to also serve as market maker, the incentives to 
generate order flow are increased: in addition to generating commissions, the 
broker can earn some portion of  the spread as well. This raises the issue of 
endogenous order flow generation, or "order flow discovery." In order to cap- 
ture  order flow, broker  marketing  efforts  may  include  customer  education 
about markets and about personal or corporate financial issues. The result may 
be increased trading and a welfare improvement for customers. The offsetting 
effect, of course, is that liquidity is typically reduced for traders who use the 
central market. 
This view of fragmentation also has implications for the empirical literature 
on trade execution quality. It is well-documented (e.g., Lee [  19931; Petersen 
and Fialkowski [  19921) that execution quality for a given stock differs among 
stock exchanges in the United States with the NYSE typically providing execu- 
tion  at least  as good  as regional exchanges. One common  interpretation  of 
poorer performance on regional exchanges is that it reflects an agency problem 
resulting from vertical integration of brokers and market makers; the incentive 
of  the broker to seek the best price is compromised. However, it could also 
reflect a payment to the broker in exchange for marketing services that would 
not have been performed in the first place had the broker not been able to route 
the trade to a particular market maker.4 
There are several implications for policy. First, given the existence of asym- 
metric information and the broker's  superior knowledge about the quality of 
order flow, it is inevitable that brokers will try to capture order flow. Preventing 
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capture of order flow would not be unambiguously beneficial.  Even mecha- 
nisms designed to ensure the best execution price, such as a consolidated limit 
order book (CLOB), may not guarantee best execution in a broad sense (by 
reducing the ability to capture order flow, the CLOB reduces the incentive by 
brokers to provide marketing services). In addition, the creation of derivative 
securities and offshore trading provide ways to bypass a CLOB. 
From a regulatory perspective, it is desirable to increase competition among 
brokers, and a key to doing this is making sure that customers have enough 
information to make an informed choice among different brokerage and trade 
execution practices. Since marketing services most benefit precisely those cus- 
tomers least able to make an informed choice, this is likely to be difficult. 
Appendix 
Using assumptions from the text, the explicit expression for + (the expected 
number of net buy orders conditional on buy orders exceeding sell orders) is 
+(no,  n,) = n,,  if no 5 n,, 
where ceil(x)  is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x and W = no + nl. 
Since informed orders can be either buys or sells, there are different terms in 
the first expression accounting for these two cases. 
The following recursive relationships may be verified by direct calculation: 
('42)  +(no, n,)  = +(no -  1,  n,) + %q(n, -  1, n,); 
where 
=  0,  W odd, 
is the probability of exactly zero buy orders with x  uninformed and y informed 
customers.  Note  that when  W is even, removing  one uninformed  customer 
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PROOF  OF LEMMA  1. (1) From equations (A2) and (A3), 4 is increasing in both 
no and  n,. (2) From  (A2), +/(no + n,) is obviously  decreasing  in no when 
no + n,  is even. For odd values, +/(no  + a,) = +/W is nonincreasing in no if 
and only if  L/2Wq(n,,  n,)  < +(no,  n,).  For given W 4 is decreasing and q is 
increasing in no,  so it is sufficient to consider the case n, = 0. It is straightfor- 
ward to show  that  r~(~q(n(~,  0) > (n,  + 2)q(q1 + 2, 0), which  implies  that 
n,q  (no,  0) is decreasing in no. Considering no = 3 as a base case, 4(3, 0) = 
1.5  and  .5  X  3q(3, 0) = .75. Thus, the  condition  holds  for  all greater  n(]. 
(3)  The claim is that (n, -  l)+(nn,  n,)  5 n,+(n,, n, -  1). Using (A3), this can 
Using equation (Al),  this inequality holds if 
Using the fact that 
and comparing terms for a given combinatorial factor shows that the inequality 
is satisfied. 
PROOF OF LEMMA  2. To demonstrate convexity of 4, we need to show that 
+(no -  1,  w  -  (no -  1)) + +(no  + 1, w  -  (no  + 1)) -  24(n,,  w -  no)  > 0. 
Consider the case where  W is odd (the case where W is even is similar and 
easier). Using the recursion relationships (A2) and (A3) we can reduce this 
inequality to 
w12-  I 
I = w12 -n ] 
Using the fact that 
(9  = ("J  l) + (;I;);  (2  = ("-  N-  1  l);  (3  = (",  '). 
the inequality can be shown to hold. 
PROOF  OF PROPOSITION  1. 
BH 
4 
= (N, -  n,)  + .S(N,, -  no)  + E[#  of exported broker buys I 0,) 
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B,  + BL = (N, -  n,)  + (No -  no) + E[# of exported broker buys I 0,] 
+ E[# of exported broker buys  I  0,l 
= (N,  -  n,)  + (No -  n,)  + E[B -  S I B -  S > 0, OH] 
Pr(B -  S  > 0 I 0,)  E[B -  S I B -  S > 0,  0,] 
Pr(B -  S > 0 I 0,)  + E[B -  S I B -  S > 0,  0,] 
Pr(B -  S > 0 I 0,) 
= (N,  -  n,)  + (N,] -  no)  + 2E[B - S I  B -  S > 01 
Pr(B -  S  > 0) 
= (N,  -  n,)  + (No -  no) + +(no, n,) 
B, -  BL = (N, -  n,)  + E[#  of exported broker buys I @,I 
-  E[#  of exported broker buys I 0,] 
Expanding the expression on the right-hand side and using the fact that 
we get 
2 




If  n, 2 no, then  B,  - BL = N,, since the Pr(Bo 2  (no - n,)/2) = 1 and 
Pr(Bo > (n, + nJ2) = 0.  If  n, <  no,  then when we expand the expression for 
B, -  B, we get 
The spread given in the text is found by substituting B, -  BL  and B,  + BL  into 
(3)  and using the fact that 4(n0,  n,)  = n,  when n, 2 no. 
PROOF  OF COROLLARY  1. (1) The market bid-ask spread is increasing in no if 
n,, -  4(fio9  n,)  > no -  1 -  +(no -  1, nl), 
which is equivalent to +(no,  n,)  < 1 + +(no -  1, n,).  This follows from (A2). 54  Kathleen Hagerty and  Robert L. McDonald 
(2) The market bid-ask spread is nondecreasing in n,  if 
n, -  4b0,  n,>  2 121 -  1 -  Mn,,  n, -  11, 
which is equivalent to +(q1,  n,)  5 I + +(no,  n, - 1). This follows from (A3). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  3. Suppose that in equilibrium  brokers selected two 
different customer mixes, n; and n;. For this to be an equilibrium, it must be 
that A@,!))  = hL(ni)  = A,.  If profits are to be zero, the Az  must satisfy 
+(nA) = n,!)X,  + (W -  nh)A,, 
and 
+(ni) = nix, + (W -  ni)A,. 
Now  consider  a  broker  who  enters  and  selects  quantity  A,  such  that 
n; <  A,  < ni. Let 6 = (A,  -  nA)/(ni -  n;).  By convexity, 
W">  < 6+,(n;) + (1 -  S)+(nA) = A,X,  + (W -  V;,,>A,, 
hence there are positive profits to entry. 
PROOF  OF LEMMA  3.1. Suppose it is optimal to deviate by ,i customers but not 
by one. Then we have 
(m +  AW,) + (M: -  (m + j))W0)  > +(no +  j), 
(m + l)Ao(no) + (w -(m + l))Al(no) < +(no + 1). 
+(no +  j)  + (j  -  I)+(n,) -  ht4n(1  + 1) <  0, 
and 
These inequalities together imply 
which violates convexity. 
PROOF  OF LEMMA  3.2. Suppose that brokers lose money either by switching to 
mix m + j or m -  i. 
(no  + j)&(no) +(W -  (no  + j>>W+,)  < +(no + 
(no -  i)A,(n,> +W -  (no -  i))Al(fiJ  < +(no -  4 
n,A,(n,)  + (W -  no)A,(n,) = +(no)> 
+(n,> +  AA,(n,)  -  X,(n,)l  <  +(no  + j) 
+(no) -  i[X,(n,) -  A,(n,)l < +(no -  4, 
Using the fact that in equilibrium 
644) 
we have 
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which implies 
i+b" +  j)  +  j+(n, -  i> >  (i +  j>+(n,>. 
PROOF  OF LEMMA  3.3. Straightforward computation verifies that this schedule 
satisfies (8), so that, given Wl  it is not optimal to select a different n,.  It is also 
necessary  to verify that, given these prices, the broker will not accept fewer 
than  W customers. Suppose the equilibrium is to accept W customers, no of 
them uninformed. The broker fails to make money by accepting one less unin- 
formed customer if 
&(no, W -  nJ(nO -  1) + A,(no, W -  n,)(W -  no) 5 +(no -  1, W -  no). 
Using (A2) and (A4), we can rewrite this as 
(-45)  0 5  &(no,  W -  no> -  %$no -  1, W -  nJ. 
Similarly, it is unprofitable  for the broker to accept one fewer informed cus- 
tomer if 
X,(n,,  W -  no)no  + A,(n,,  W -  no)(W -  no -  1) 5 +(no,  W -  no -  1). 
Again using (A2), (A4), and (9), we can write this as 
0 9 &(no, W -  no) -  !hq(n, -  1, W -  no). 
We conclude that given the schedule (9),  it is optimal to accept one less unin- 
formed customer if  and only if it is optimal to accept one less informed cus- 
tomer. We  wish to verify that it is not optimal to accept one less customer. 
Using (A2) and (S), (A5) can be rewritten as 
(A61 
For simplicity, we will consider just the case of  W even (when W is odd, the 
above expression can be shown to hold with equality). Using (A2), (A6) can 
be rewritten 
no+(& -  1, w -  no) + (W -  no)+(no,  W -  n,) -  1) 
-  (W -  1) +(no, w  -  no)  2 0. 
(W -  no)+(no,  w  -  no -  1) 2 (W -  no -  l)+(no, w  -  no), 
which follows from lemma 1. 
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Comment  Lawrence E. Hams 
This paper examines a formal model of brokerage crossing markets in which 
residual  order flows are cleared in a central competitive dealer market. One 
purpose of the paper, to judge from its title, introduction, and conclusion, is to 
obtain  some results about fragmented  markets. Although the paper also ad- 
dresses other issues, I will confine my remarks to this one. 
The authors conclude that fragmentation may be a reflection of  increased 
price competition. This conclusion is obtained in the following sense: broker- 
age crossing markets that are fragmented and competitive provide better prices 
for (uninformed) customers than do monopolistic brokerage crossing markets. 
The result follows from assumed inelasticities of customer demands to trade 
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and from zero-profit conditions applied to competitive brokers and to competi- 
tive dealers. These assumptions ensure that the pie of wealth that can be distrib- 
uted among market participants is of fixed size. The monopolistic broker mar- 
ket structure provides inferior prices because the brokerage reduces the size of 
the pie by taking out monopoly profits. 
Although I found the result interesting, it does not completely address the 
problem that I think about when I hear the adjective fragmented placed before 
the noun markets: I would like to know whether any broker should be allowed 
to cross orders internally. This question seems to be at the heart of many of the 
current controversies about fragmented markets. 
This paper does not attempt to answer this question. To do so would require 
a welfare analysis that would have to consider how the interests of informed 
traders, uninformed  traders, and securities industry intermediaries  should be 
weighed relative to each other. Issues relating to the external benefits of price 
discovery and liquidity would also need to be considered. In addition, various 
agency problems and other issues too numerous to mention here would affect 
the analysis. These issues are all beyond the scope of this paper. 
The paper does, however, provide a very important result about price dis- 
crimination among diverse traders. The authors formally prove that competi- 
tive brokers who can discriminate between informed and uninformed traders 
will, and must, charge different commissions to the two types of traders. Any 
crossing broker who tries to charge an intermediate price would get only in- 
formed traders. Pursuing this pricing strategy would be unprofitable. 
This conclusion  is very important because  such discrimination  can be ef- 
fected only in a fragmented market. It cannot be provided in an anonymous 
central market to which all orders are routed. 
The fragmentation that we see in the U.S.  equity markets reflects this price 
discrimination.  Many dealers pay brokers for order flows from retail traders 
who are widely believed to be uninformed.  Competition among brokers will 
pass these payments through to the customer in the form of reduced commis- 
sions. The uninformed order flow will thereby pay lower transaction costs than 
they would pay in a completely anonymous market. 
Having raised the issue of payment for order flow,  I would  like to finish 
by discussing a related public policy issue concerning best execution. Should 
brokers be required to search for best price for small orders when they can 
obtain the best wholesale price plus some payment for order flow? If the pay- 
ments for order flow reflects the appropriate  discount  from the anonymous 
market price, the answer should be no. 
Now, consider what happens if we require the broker to search anyway. Will 
the broker do it? Only if the benefits of an improved price can be measured by 
the customer. If the price improvement is not recognized by the customer, no 
competitive broker will search beyond the anonymous market price. To do so 
would incur search costs that would not produce recognizable benefits to the 
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I believe that most retail clients cannot effectively audit their agent’s search 
for best execution. They do not  trade frequently  enough,  they do not trade 
with enough different brokers, and they cannot easily collect the information 
necessary to determine whether the trade prices are consistently good or bad. 
Retail clients know their commission costs, but they do not know how good 
their price is relative to what is appropriate for their order type. 
The existing system thus helps solve the agency problem. By requiring bro- 
kers to search further for best price, we only exacerbate the agency problem 
because  we  force  brokers  to  compete to  provide  immeasurable  services. 
Agency problems are solved by improving measurement. 
We might imagine that we could help small uninformed traders by requiring 
that their orders be consolidated to a single market that provides prices appro- 
priate to them. The results in this paper suggest that market cannot exist with- 
out the brokers’ active participation. They must discriminate among the orders. 
Otherwise, informed traders will try to use the uninformed traders’ market. A 
broker must have an incentive to participate. Payment for order flow provides 
these incentives. 
Comment  Geoffrey P. Miller 
Kathleen Hagerty and Robert McDonald provide a theoretical exploration of 
one aspect of the phenomenon of market fragmentation and offer suggestions 
about the implications for public policy. 
As a law professor with a strong interest in the regulation of financial mar- 
kets and institutions, I found the paper to be stimulating and thoughtful, but 
ultimately not very informative about the proper direction of public policy. The 
conditions set up in the authors’ model are so general and abstract that they 
don’t  allow for much purchase on real-world  institutions. Beyond this, even 
under the constraints of the model, the authors are not able to draw unambigu- 
ous policy conclusions. This may  not be  a particularly telling critique of  a 
piece of pure theory, but it is important to make the observation because those 
who are constructing social policy need all the help they can get from theory 
in an area as rapidly evolving and complex as this. 
Perhaps I could summarize my basic  critique by  recommending  that the 
authors revise the title of  their paper-instead  of  “Brokerage, Market Frag- 
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mentation, and Securities Market Regulation,” they should strike all the words 
after “Market Fragmentation” and insert an “and” after “Brokerage”-the  pa- 
per, in other words, might be more satisfying if it were simply about “Broker- 
age and Market Fragmentation,” without venturing into the field of legal regu- 
lation. 
The authors’ general view of  market fragmentation is that it might not be 
such a bad thing. Brokers receiving order flows from informed and uninformed 
customers can distinguish between them, and find that it is a profitable strategy 
to act as counterparties rather than as mere brokers when dealing with unin- 
formed customers. Thus, trading gets diverted away from the centralized ex- 
change. Because of competition among brokers, the benefits of this strategy 
are shared with customers. Both brokers and customers benefit from this kind 
of market fragmentation. 
This model has some plausibility,  but it leaves important questions unan- 
swered. 
The authors provide an account of market fragmentation that does not de- 
pend on the off-market transaction free riding on the price discovery function 
of a centralized market. But their account is not  inconsistent with the free- 
riding theory, suggesting, at most, that there might be forces other than free 
riding that drive off-exchange trading. 
The authors  acknowledge  the potential  real-world  importance  of  agency 
costs in this setting, but they abstract this factor out of their model. Yet  the 
conflict of interest that arises when  a broker has the opportunity to act as a 
counterparty is obvious. The model the authors propose places brokers in the 
role of protecting themselves against the costs of dealing with informed traders 
by directing a portion of  the informed trades  to the central exchange  while 
keeping much of  the uninformed trade for themselves.  Yet  it seems at least 
equally likely that it will be securities firms that are the informed traders re- 
lative to their customers, and that customers face the losses associated with 
dealing with their brokers as counterparties. 
The authors recognize that market fragmentation in their model has poten- 
tially deleterious consequences for centralized markets. This includes a reduc- 
tion  in  liquidity  of  the primary  market  and associated  increases in  bid-ask 
spreads. Presumably, under their model, you would also observe an increase in 
the proportion of informed to uninformed  traders in the centralized  market 
as a result of market fragmentation. Thus, uninformed traders dealing on the 
centralized market face a higher probability of trading with an informed coun- 
terparty. It might be worth exploring whether  the Hagerty-McDonald  model 
predicts a kind  of  snowball effect or variant of Gresham’s law,  as informed 
traders drive out uninformed traders on the centralized market. In any event, 
public policy analysis should look at the costs of market fragmentation on the 
centralized market and compare, if possible, these costs with the benefits real- 
ized in collateral markets. 
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They present a picture of trading that occurs either on a centralized market or 
with brokers, but they do not model the complex array of off-market trading 
that occurs in practice. Of course, this is a function of the constraints of formal 
modeling, which is difficult enough even in stylized settings, much less in set- 
tings that reflect the muddiness of real-world practice. 
Perhaps more troubling, the model appears to have greatest application in 
settings where the prices and orders are determined in individual negotiations 
with a broker. This is more descriptive of over-the-counter markets for custom 
products such as derivatives than for organized equity trading. But such OTC 
markets have never been characterized by extensive trading on centralized ex- 
changes, so with respect to these products we are not dealing with market 
fragmentation-these  markets are fragmented to begin with. The authors are 
correct that their model has some application for equity trading, but they could 
usefully develop this point further. 
This paper is premised on the assumption that brokers can distinguish the 
uninformed and informed traders in the order flow. This assumption might 
stand further support, given the possibility that informed traders might present 
themselves as uninformed traders in order to obtain the benefits of the favor- 
able treatment that broker-dealers are capable of giving to uninformed traders. 
There may be ways that broker-dealers can make this distinction; for example, 
the broker’s knowledge of the customer, or the size of the trade. But the authors 
might further elaborate this point. 
In general, the paper asks an interesting question and makes an important 
contribution to the literature, but does not offer substantial insights into the 
identification of optimal social policy or the formulation of desirable legal reg- 
ulation. 
Authors’ Reply 
Both Lawrence Harris and Geoffrey Miller express the wish that we had en- 
gaged in a broader analysis of trade-crossing and market fragmentation. Before 
addressing their specific comments (many of which we are sympathetic with), 
we would like to place our paper in perspective. A crude but largely accurate 
characterization of the microstructure literature is that it assumes that all orders 
transact at one price in one location, although perhaps with competitive market 
makers (exceptions to this characterization were noted in our paper). Recent 
years have seen the rapid growth of  off-exchange trading systems, including 
some that explicitly purchase order flow, cross offsetting orders, and then ex- 
port to the central market (in effect hedging) any residual order flow. 
We  see our paper as a first attempt at understanding the economic effects of 
this kind of  trade crossing. As we indicate in the paper, we think the stylized 
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model suggests that, even in a world where all traders trade one share, the bid- 
ask spread is at best a crude indicator of prices paid and received by investors. 
The model predicts that heterogeneous treatment of customers should be wide- 
spread. Somewhat surprisingly, competitive order-crossing brokers will seek 
to deal with both informed and uninformed traders. 
Harris is concerned by the omission in our paper of a welfare analysis. In 
particular, how do we trade-off the interests of informed investors, uninformed 
investors, market intermediaries, and other market participants broadly de- 
fined? In some sense, the answer to this question represents the Holy Grail of 
security market policymaking. We did not attempt a welfare analysis in the 
paper, and our guess is that this kind of question is, in the end, unanswerable. 
Knowledgeable price discrimination by brokers will help uninformed traders 
and hurt those traders who pay the full market spread. We are pessimistic that 
there will ever be an unambiguous ranking of systems that hurt one group and 
help another. We think of efficiency questions as being more interesting, which 
leads to the next point. 
Both Harris and Miller point out a closely related limitation in our analysis, 
one we agree is important. Markets in our model do not discover prices. There 
is no way for us to analyze the effect of brokers free riding off a central market 
price. If  the siphoning of  traders away from the central market reduces the 
informativeness of prices, financial markets will do a poorer job of providing 
signals useful in resource allocation. It is an interesting question whether com- 
plete  reporting  of  trades makes prices  sufficiently  informative,  even if  the 
trades occur at disparate locations. There are reasons for thinking reporting 
alone is not sufficient, which is why this question is so important. 
In our setting, the information content in orders is ultimately preserved via 
the export of net orders. It seems reasonable to speculate that trade crossing 
would reduce central market liquidity, however, since the market maker sees 
lower trade volume. This might be offset by the availability of greater liquidity 
from the crossing brokers, who know their customers and their trade motives 
well and hence will make deeper markets for them. 
While we also agree with Miller that we have little to contribute in the way 
of active suggestions for market regulation, our paper does sound a cautionary 
note for regulators. The market in which all participants trade in one place at 
one price is not necessarily the market preferred by all traders, and there is no 
compelling reason for thinking it best in any sense. We view our contribution 
as describing a benefit associated with fragmentation which, while not a policy 
prescription, should have value for thinking about policy. This Page Intentionally Left Blank